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Fields v. State, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 36 (Dec 10, 2009) 1
Evidence – Admissibility of Prior Bad Act Evidence
Summary
This case is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court judgment of conviction of
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The appellant asserts error in admitting
prior bad act evidence, error in excluding witness testimony as inadmissible extrinsic evidence,
error in admitting telephone conversations subject to martial privilege, error in instructing the
jury on specific intent, and improper argument by the prosecutor in closing argument.
Disposition/Outcome
Fields’ conviction of murder and conspiracy to commit murder was affirmed because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.
Factual and Procedural History
This case involves the murder of Jaromir Palensky. In 2002, Palensky was sentenced to
an 18-month prison term. Before Palensky went to prison, he gave Linda Fields (Linda) general
power of attorney. While Palensky was serving his prison term, Linda liquidated a number of his
assets and transferred the proceeds into joint accounts held with John Vernon Fields (Fields).
Additionally, Linda took out a $300,000 life insurance policy on Palensky’s life and listed
herself as the beneficiary. Furthermore, after Palensky’s death a will surfaced. The will named
Linda and Fields as beneficiaries and recited that it had been written for Palensky by a man that
had since deceased. Evidence presented at trial established that the writing was a forgery by
Fields.
Before Palensky disappeared, he had been living in a trailer on the ranch leased by Fields
and Linda. At that time he was working for Fields and Linda as a ranch hand. Palensky was last
seen alive in December of 2003, at the ranch. In January of 2004, Palensky’s body was found
floating in a river. Forensic evidence showed that blunt force blows to the back of his head had
killed Palensky.
Fields and Linda were tried in separate trials and Fields was charged with first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Fields argued that he did not murder Palensky, and
that even if Linda arranged Palensky’s death, he was not involved with any scheme to murder
him.
At trial, the district court admitted prior bad act evidence regarding Roy Mobert.
Mobert’s lawyer, Gregory Corn, provided the evidence. Corn testified that Mobert gave Linda
power of attorney in 2000 and revised his will to include her and Fields as beneficiaries before
Mobert underwent a hospital procedure. Linda subsequently used the power of attorney to sell
some of Mobert’s assets and transfer to proceeds into joint accounts held with Fields. When
Mobert realized this, he sued Linda and Fields. To settle the suit, Linda and Fields returned the
money they had and provided a note for the rest, secured by a deed of trust on the Silver Dollar
Bar. Linda and Fields defaulted on the note and filed for bankruptcy in 2002. In November
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2003, Mobert obtained an order lifting the bankruptcy court stay against foreclosure on the Silver
Dollar Bar. Shortly thereafter Palensky disappeared. The district court also admitted a tape
recording of Fields, Linda and Billy Wells discussing a scheme to kill Mobert and make it look
like an accident. The State argued that the recorded conversation was similar to one Linda and
Fields had with Ralph Mackley about killing Palensky because in both instances Linda indicated
that the victim was a child molester.
Fields challenged the admissibility of the evidence offered by Corn and the taped
conversations, claiming that they were inadmissible as propensity evidence. The district court
admitted the evidence to establish that Linda and Fields had monetary motive to kill Palensky,
that Fields had knowledge of the scheme to murder Palensky, and to prove identity. The district
court found that the evidence was sufficiently clear and convincing to admit it into evidence.
The district court also found that in light of the limiting instructions provided to jurors and the
fact that the contested evidence took less than a half day of the two-week trial, the risk of unfair
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
In addition, at trial the district court excluded testimony of two witnesses who would
have testified about negative statements made to them by third parties concerning Mike Walker,
a witness for the State. It also admitted evidence of recorded telephone conversations between
Linda and Fields from when Linda was in jail. Furthermore, in its jury instruction on specific
intent, the district court stated that “murder is a specific intent crime” and that “[s]pecific intent
means the intent or active desire to accomplish a precise act or hidden objective.” However, the
district court did not add that “specific intent is not merely the intent to do an act,” as requested
by Fields.
Finally, when Linda spoke to Fields on a jail phone, she complained that she was in jail
because of what Fields did, and Fields did not contest that accusation. At the district court, the
State commented on Fields’s silence, and Fields objected. The district court sustained the
objection as it could be inferred as a comment on Fields’s refusal to testify, but overruled the
objection to the extent that the silence was an adoptive admission.
The jury convicted Fields of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with
the death of Palensky. Fields appealed, asserting error in admitting prior bad act evidence, error
in excluding witness testimony as inadmissible extrinsic evidence, error in admitting telephone
conversations subject to martial privilege, error in instructing the jury on specific intent, and
improper argument by the prosecutor in closing argument.
Discussion
Standard of Review
A district court’s decision regarding admission of prior bad act evidence is not reversed
on appeal unless there is a finding of manifest error. 2
Admissibility of Prior Bad Act Evidence
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts cannot be introduced into evidence to “prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” 3 Prior bad act
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evidence may be admissible for proof of motive, intent, knowledge, or identity. 4 Such evidence
is only admissible when the trial court determines “that: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime
charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 5
The Court held that there was no error in admitting the prior bad act evidence because the
prior bad act evidence of Fields’s interactions with Mobert and prior discussions regarding
killing Mobert were relevant to motive, intent, knowledge, and identity. The Court reasoned that
at the time Palensky disappeared, Linda and Fields were in desperate financial condition due to
their prior interaction with Mobert. As beneficiaries to a life insurance policy on Palensky, and
to Palensky’s forged will, Linda and Fields stood to benefit financially from Palensky’s death,
providing a motive to kill Palensky. Additionally, the Court held that the Mobert evidence had
relevance to knowledge and intent because it showed that Fields was not an innocent bystander
to Linda’s plan to commit murder. The Court concluded that prior participation in a conspiracy
may be admissible to refute claims by the defendant that his acts in a subsequent conspiracy were
“nothing more than innocent acts of a friend, and not a knowing participation in a conspiracy.” 6
Finally, the Court held that the Mobert evidence tended to prove identity. Evidence of prior bad
acts may be admissible only when the “prior behavior demonstrates characteristics of conduct
which are unique and common to both the defendant and the perpetrator whose identity is in
question.” 7 The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that the Mobert and Palensky facts were sufficiently similar and unique for use in showing
identity. The Court reasoned that the facts were sufficiently similar because both Mobert and
Palensky were older men that gave Linda power of attorney which she used to transfer assets to
accounts held by Linda and Fields. In both cases, when the men recovered, Linda and Fields
spoke with third parties about killing the men. Additionally, in each encounter, Linda falsely
accused the men of being a child molester in conversation with the third parties.
The Court concluded that the Mobert evidence was sufficiently clear and convincing to
admit it into evidence. The Court also concluded that in light of the limiting instructions
provided to jurors and the fact that the contested evidence took less than a half day of the twoweek trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the risk of unfair
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
Exclusion of Witness Testimony as Inadmissible Hearsay
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
testimony of two witnesses who would have testified about negative statements made to them by
third parties concerning a witness for the State. The Court concluded that such testimony was
inadmissible hearsay because no evidence indicated that the third parties were unavailable,
because the statements were not statements against penal interest, and because the statements
were not excited utterances.
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Admissibility of Jail Telephone Conversations
The Court rejected Fields’s argument that admission of recorded telephone conversations
between Linda and Fields from when Linda was in jail violated the marital privilege. 8 The Court
reasoned that because both Linda, as the inmate, and Fields, as the outside caller, listened to
warnings that indicated that their conversation was being recorded, Fields waived any
expectation of privacy.
Jury Instruction on Intent
The Court rejected Fields’s argument that the jury instruction was inadequate because it
did not state that “murder is a specific intent crime” and “[s]pecific intent means the intent or
active desire to accomplish a precise act or forbidden objective, not merel the intent to do an
act.” The Court reached this conclusion because the jury was instructed that “the Defendant
cannot be found guilty of murder merely because it was a natural and probable consequence of
the conspiracy unless he had a specific intent to commit murder” and that first degree murder
requires a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” The Court found that the jury
instruction provided adequately conveyed the information Fields sought to add to the specific
intent instruction. 9
Admissibility of State’s Comment Regarding Fields’s Silence
At trial court, the State commented on Fields’s silence after Linda accused him of being
the cause of her incarceration, and Fields objected. The district court sustained the objection as it
could be inferred as a comment on Fields’s refusal to testify, but overruled the objection to the
extent that the silence was an adoptive admission. On appeal, the Court concluded that the
State’s comment should have been more narrowly tailored but found that the district court’s
ruling did not constitute reversible error.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making the
evidentiary rulings it did or commit instructional error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the
judgment of conviction.
Dissenting Opinion (Cherry, J.)
Justice Cherry’s dissenting opinion questioned the relevance of the bad act evidence and
whether its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. Justice Cherry pointed out that
Corn was not Mobert’s attorney at the time that Linda obtained power of attorney for Mobert,
but his testimony focused on that time period. Furthermore, Justice Cherry questioned the
relevance of the testimony regarding Fields’s conversations with Wells, because the recorded
conversations were not sufficient to bring charges against Fields and because the officers
involved questioned Wells’s reliability. The dissenting opinion also found that the prior act
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evidence was insufficient to show identity because it was not an “integral part of an overarching
plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant.” 10
Justice Cherry found that the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the danger of misleading the jury. 11 This
opinion relied on the finding that explanation of a civil suit during a criminal prosecution is
confusing to the jury to the differing standards.
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